Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Institutions: Institutions are social structures that organize and guide human behavior. They can be formal or informal, and they can be public or private._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Public Choice Theory on Institutions - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 197 Institutions/Public choice theory/Farber: interactions between different branches of government: Public choice assumes that actors are strategic (Cooter, 2002)(1) - that is, they consider how other actors will respond to their own actions and adjust their decisions accordingly. This allows public choice theory to use the tools of game theory to study political behavior. Example/USA: (…) the complex interactions between Congress, agencies, and courts in statutory interpretation. Congress must decide how much discretion to give agencies. In making this decision, Congress needs to consider how agencies will exercise that discretion and how courts will respond to agency actions. Agencies, in turn, must consider whether courts will uphold their decisions and how Congress will respond to their exercise of discretion (for instance, in determining their budgets). If they are outcome oriented, as public choice assumes, judges must also consider how their decisions will influence future agency actions, whether their decisions will be overridden by Congress, and possibly how judicial strategies might influence the willingness of Congress to give discretion to agencies. Congress itself is a complex entity, composed of two Parisi I 198 branches (and, depending on the complexity of the model, of gatekeeper committees). Each actor is influenced by its expectations about how all of the other actors will behave. Public choice: (…) game theory can be used to establish equilibrium patterns in which the expectations of all the actors are consistent with their strategies. Yet, given the complexity of the interactions (Jacobi, 2010(2), p. 242), it should not be surprising that the solutions are highly dependent on the precise assumptions and empirical support is spotty (Mashaw, 2010(3), pp. 40-41; Stephenson, 2010(4), p. 315). Thus, while the work in this area has great interest, the conclusions are far from robust. >Government structures/Public choice theory, >Constitutional structures/Public choice theory. 1. Cooter, R. D. (2002). The Strategic constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Jacobi, T. (2010). "The Judiciary," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 234—259. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 4. Stephenson, M. C. (2010). "Statutory Interpretation by Agencies," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19—48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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